P.O. Box 513 Launceston Tasmania 7250 . Tel. 0428 137 050 . email li82303@bigpond.net.au
28 September 2020
Michael Stretton General Manager City of Launceston Council P.O. Box 396 LAUNCESTON TAS 7250
By email to: contactus@Launceston.tas.gov.au
Dear Sir,
Re: DA0320/2020 7 Willis Street Launceston; Educational and Occasional Care – Construction of educational building (Science, Health and Research) incorporating clinical rooms, exercise physiology facilities, consultation rooms, research and teaching laboratories, simulation labs, teaching and shared work spaces, staff facilities and amenities, café, end of trip facilities and associated landscaping. Development of car parking to service the Willis Street building and general university population together with passive recreation areas and access pathways through campus. Demolition works as follows : 80 Cimitiere Street – the previous National Automobile Museum of Tasmania including associated infrastructure including garden beds, appendices, portal roof and walkway; 78 Cimitiere Street – Demolition of three existing buildings and associated infrastructure formerly occupied by Crystal Cleaning; Removal existing parking infrastructure including lighting, fences and shipping container; and the removal of eight trees on site from the Boland We refer to the public notice dated 12 September 2020.
Our Group is determined to keep the City of Launceston Councillors reminded of the folly of its support of the Utas campus relocation.
Winston Churchill had a great saying “When you are walking through hell it is best that you keep walking” , and so we will continue, with the recollection of that great statesman resounding in our ears, our Group is making this representation consistent with our earlier representations and submissions that have strenuously opposed the development of a relocated campus of the University of Tasmania to the Inveresk and Willis Street flood plains, which will be subjected to increasing threat from climate change affecting sea level rises in the Tamar/Esk estuary, and further threatened by predicted seismic activity that would cause collapse of/ damage to the flood levee system.
We again dispute whether this application has been advertised clearly to the public in that it has been advertised as an address at 7 Willis Street Launceston, without any reference to 78 or 80 Cimitiere Street or that the land also fronts Boland Street including vehicular access thereto. There is no specific reference to the foot bridge construction over Boland Street, which was not included in that earlier Development Approval.
1 There is no reference in the application to the demolition of the platform structure of the former and historic Tasmanian Main Line Railway Company. This structure is an important historic artefact and should be recognised and considered in context of the responsibility to protect and enhance the historic cultural heritage significance of the local heritage place and more broadly the heritage precinct.
The largest portion of the land upon which this application is proposed, (the former Goods Railyard) is land transferred to the Ratepayers of the City of Launceston by the Commonwealth Government for the specific purpose of constructing community affordable housing, and not for the development of a university campus. This reason for the land being owned by the City of Launceston Council imposes certain responsibilities on City of Launceston Council (CoL) and its ratepayers.
Nothing written has, nor can it, extinguish the principle of implied trust.
The land is on a tidal flood plain and is subject to certain seismic activity risks. Not only does the seismic risk endanger the safety of any infrastructure that may exist or is proposed to be constructed there, but it also endangers the stability and durability of the City Flood Levee system which allegedly is intended to make-safe the land area in question. This application continues to promote the fast-changing flood risk modelling stating. This is not low risk and only likely to occur at a time beyond the life cycle of the proposed University building structures, to the contrary the expression 1:100 years DOES NOT mean that such a flood will only occur once in one hundred years, as has been publicly stated by several Councillors.
Former State Treasury official, (Mr. Don Challen), was a strident opponent of any further building intensification within the Flood Inundation Zone. This was in part due to his concerns of an increase in government compensation liability, should the area be flooded. This significant financial liability will likely extend to City of Launceston Council acting as the Planning Authority, and to the Councillors who made the determination.
A one-hundred-year flood is a flood event that has a 1 in 100 chance (1% probability) of being equalled or exceeded in any given year.
The 100-year flood has also been referred to as the 1% flood, since its annual exceedence probability is 1%. For coastal or lake flooding, the 100-year flood is generally expressed as a flood elevation or depth, and may include wave effects. For river systems, the 100-year flood is generally expressed as a flow rate. Based on the expected 100-year flood flow rate, the flood water level can be mapped as an area of inundation. The resulting floodplain map is referred to as the 100-year floodplain. The common misunderstanding is that a 100-year flood is likely to occur only once in a 100-year period is incorrect. In fact, there is approximately a 63.4% chance of one or more 100-year floods occurring in a 100-year period.
The objectives of the LUPA Act includes for sustainable development whereby in Part 1 sustainable development is defined as managing the use, development and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate , which enables
2 people and communities to provide for their social, economic and cultural well-being and for their health and safety while2(c) avoiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment.
And in Part 2
(f) to promote the health and wellbeing of all Tasmanians and visitors to Tasmania by ensuring a pleasant, efficient and safe environment for working, living and recreation, and
(i) to provide a planning framework which fully considers land capability.
It is our general submission that CoL fails its ratepayers, citizens and visitors to Tasmania should it allow this unstable, flood prone and undesirable land to be further developed as a University Campus, when prudent and feasible alternatives are available, if not elsewhere within the Central Launceston area, then on the site that has already been established and contains substantial infrastructure and is surrounded by significant community resources, and does not suffer from an inability to be evacuated in the event of flooding, inundation by sea level rises or climate change or such dangers and risks being compounded by seismic activity.
Details of subsequent changes are described in the widely circulated and peer-reviewed EVALUATIVE REVIEW of the University of Tasmania Inveresk Precinct Redevelopment Project, commissioned by Northern Tasmanian Network Partners and Associates, and authored by eminent researcher Chris Penna.
Precipitated by behind-the-scenes political activists and opportunists, with electoral cycles and pork barrelling, the ridiculous relocation of the Newnham campus to the flood plains of Inveresk and Willis Street sites has been imposed on our Launceston Community. Suggestions of a central Launceston university population of 10,000 students and supported by a staff numbering 500 people is a ludicrous dream. Covid 19 issues that have already devastated university populations worldwide, and in particular the overseas Chinese student market, will prevent any expansion of the small campus in Launceston from occurring, and at the very least for quite a number of years, if not decades. Already, UTas has pushed out their student population forecasts until 2032.
Substantive community support has never existed for this relocation project, and the ludicrous traffic congestion and lack of adequate parking for a relocated university campus continues to be the basis of a raging public discourse. The UTas Newnham campus has generous parking and land for expansion of the university precinct. It already sits in a residential area that has re-accommodated the student population, and the Mowbray Shopping district caters for a broad variety of cultural cuisines. That student population will not simply vacate Mowbray and move to the yet-to-be constructed accommodation facilities in central Launceston. The transport system pressures that will inevitably occur to connect from Newnham/Mowbray to an Inveresk/Willis St campus will place an unaffordable impost on our ratepayers.
There are references to a CMP prepared by Paul Davies & Associates. This CMP was undertaken without public input, scrutiny or public acceptance. It has no authority in adjudication about what should or how what is of cultural heritage significance or
3 what be retained or managed into the future. The CMP appears to be a self-serving document produced only in 2019.
We are confident that this present Development Application is not supported by Launceston ratepayers, and it is interesting that the even more dramatic campus relocation in Hobart from Sandy Bay to Hobart central city, has been abandoned by UTas, due to the unaffordable costs and realities of the situation, now revealed.
The banner of RETREAT from building and retaining developments on flood plains that will be further impacted by climate change and rising sea levels and furthermore with seismic risks, could not be more solemn. The spectre of liability for allowing this development to occur will be forever a dark cloud over the heads of the present Councillors who are being lead along to sanction and approve it.
Seemingly oblivious to publicity and public opinion (see The Examiner Tuesday September 15, 2020) the Pitt and Sherry report is quoted “Based on these changes for the 1 per cent event the Launceston Levee and Inveresk Levee are expected to top”. And “Any structure at either the Willis St or the Inveresk site is likely to have a life above 30 years. Therefore it would be prudent to consider flood scenarios at periods within that life. As no defined criteria are in place for development in floodprone areas, developers should consider the risk associated with their development and plan appropriately”.
The journalist goes on to report that at a 2 per cent increase, bothe the Willis Street and Inveresk sites would be severely impacted by floodwater for an extended period following the flood levee failure. The report said if a levee failure occurred the onset of the water would be rapid, and the flood behaviour would be unsafe for everyone. Not reported from the application, is the admission that in addition to the flooded situation would it be unsafe for people, but that there would be structural damage and the campus would be inoperable for multiple weeks….
Accordingly, we implore that this Development Application be refused, and political influence be instead engaged to redirect the allocated funding to either the present site at Newnham or another central site that is not flood prone or at risk of collapsing flood levees.
Yours faithfully,
Lionel J. Morrell
Architect For Northern Tasmanian Network Partners and Associates
Copy to Ian J N Routley, Leigh Murrell, Jillian Koshin, & Chris Penna.
Enc.
ATTACHMENT Summation of Workshop June 2019 THE STANDING OF ETHICS IN RELATION TO Utas INVERESK PRECINCT REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT
APPENDIX 1 TRUST, TRANSPARENCY AND SOCIAL LICENCE: PUBLIC INTEREST AND COMMUNITY CONSULTATION FAILURE (EXTRACT).
4 ATTACHMENT SUMMATION OF RESEARCH WORKSHOP attended by members of Northern Tasmanian Network Partners & Associates :
THE STANDING OF ETHICS IN RELATION TO UTas INVERESK PRECINCT REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT June 2019
Two articles by John Hewson published in the Launceston Examiner, (28 December 2018 and 25 January 2019) raised issues of considerable concern for many Australians. In his articles, one of which was head-lined “Australia’s in the midst of moral, ethical decline” Dr Hewson talked about “trust deficit” and “a longer term erosion of the moral and ethical standards across society, as well as their application and enforcement”.
He pointed out that the loss of public confidence is not only with our politicians, political processes but also with a broad range of institutions – “churches, banks (and more broadly in business) various sports, the RSL, and numerous authorities ranging from the police, judicial processes through to a host of regulatory authorities…ASIC/APRA and even the Reserve Bank)”’. Geoffrey Watson QC expressed similar concerns and a “falling trust in politicians” in a local ABC radio interview in November 2018 and in subsequent interviews. He described Tasmania’s Integrity Commission as a toothless tiger. He talked about transparency, hidden agendas, secrecy and the influence of lobbyists on politicians in Tasmania.1
Dr Hewson and Geoffrey Watson didn’t include universities in the list of institutions, but in a recent ABC radio interview (5 July 2019) well-known journalist, Ray Martin did mention universities. He talked about the cult of secrecy with governments and public servants disliking “light being shone in dark corners”. He had addressed university students earlier in the day and explained how he had told them that “we can’t have the sort of open, free democracy that we have don’t have watch dogs, if people aren’t watching, not just governments, but public servants and parliament and universities etc…big organisations, all the institutions…all need to be scrutinised.”
In an ABC radio interview in Tasmanian in 2018 about the Tamar Valley Peace Festival, VC Prof. Rufus Black also talked about integrity and “breach of trust” and “a kind of stain that’s been spreading across Australian society, in politics, then went into churches, businesses, as we’ve been seeing recently with the royal commission.” The Ethics Centre has written about social licence and how “big companies with controversial practice often give out community grants and investments” in an effort to buy “social licence’ and “community acceptance”, in an approach that the Ethics Centre refers to as “a calculated and cynical payoff”.2
In Tasmania, there are serious public concerns about the actions and culture around the University of Tasmania (UTas). UTas is a cossetted monopoly in Tasmania. Under the management of the past 6-7 years, a culture of misrepresentation, deception, real estate matters and staff intimidation has evolved. In Launceston, this has occurred as the result of combined Launceston City Council (LCC)-UTas’ management ambition and lobbying to secure millions of dollars in public funding, including $300 million to relocate the Launceston and Burnie main campuses (consisting of $150 m from the Federal government, $150 m from the Tasmanian government, plus gifts of several parcels of public land from the Launceston and Burnie City Councils).
From the start, the plan for the relocation of the entire Launceston campus (concomitant with and mirroring the Burnie and Hobart plans) away from a safe, secure fully-operating campus to a site only 3-4 kilometres away - on an estuarine flood inundation zone that sits below high tide level, and with severe traffic and parking issues - has lacked any significant supporting evidence or academic rigour. The plan is full of obvious inherent
1 2
See also ABC radio news transcript, 7 March 2019, comments by Geoffrey Watson.
The Ethics Centre, “Ethics Explainer: Social license to operate”, ethics.org.au, 23 January 2018.
5 flaws, ongoing inconsistencies and planning ‘on the run’. In other words, it is/has been a shambles. These matters were recently the subject of a highly critical article by Richard Flanagan in the Hobart Mercury.3
Since 2012, the process has involved a lengthy, convoluted series of machinations and ad hoc reactionary actions and responses. Furthermore, it has involved a complete rejection of community opinion as well as serious intimidation of UTas staff who objected or criticised the plans. In the push to obtain funding promises in the lead up to the 2016 federal election, UTas, LCC and lobbyists operated, and continue to do so, outside ethical, integrity and academic standards. The lobbying and propaganda were thorough and highly successful. Outlandish claims used to support the Launceston campus move to Inveresk, such as the projected enrolment of an additional 12,500 students, (10,000 of whom would, they claimed, be from Tasmania – a statistical impossibility) combined with threats that the northern section of the university would close if it didn’t move to Inveresk, not only went unchallenged, but they were accepted by all levels of government, the major parties and most politicians.
After much assistance and ‘coaching’, UTas eventually submitted a ‘final’ business case to Infrastructure Australia (IA). This was right on the final deadline it had been given, 31 January 2019, potentially it seems, for routine and expedient approval post 2019 election. It appears that this UTas proposal by-passed Stages 1 and 2 of the IA assessment process, to go straight to Stage 3 where it was evaluated by IA.
The trust deficit, and the erosion of moral and ethical standards discussed by Dr Hewson, Geoffrey Watson QC and others are applicable to this situation in Tasmania. It might also be noteworthy that the three main instigators behind the Tasmanian plans, and the associated degeneration of ethics, integrity and honesty, and the sheer success of Illusory Truth Effect, - LCC GM Dobrzynski, VC Rathjen and Provost Calford - have all since left Tasmania for greener pastures. (Sep ’17, Oct ’17, Jan-Feb ’18 respectively) Trying to condense the issue into as few pages as possible but it is not an easy task, given the nature and volume of material involved. The following four examples might be the easiest way to sum up the misrepresentation, deception and due diligence failure within UTas and LCC and the cosy relationship between them, that have been features of this matter. Sections marked in bold in are direct quotes.
Example 1. The plan was initiated around mid-2012 by the then LCC General Manager (GM), Robert Dobrzynski, when he started working behind the scenes to achieve his aim and to encourage UTas, to change the original intended location – the UTas Newnham campus – of its planned NRAS funded student accommodation. The GM’s enticement involved ‘giving’ a parcel of public land at Inveresk to UTas for the accommodation building. He ignored the existing high-level Master Plans for both Inveresk Precinct, the Mowbray Precinct sections of the Greater Launceston Plan and the major plans for the Mowbray-Newnham campus. He also ignored the legally constituted York Park Inveresk Precinct Authority, (YPIPA) its 4 community members and senior state public servant member (head of Events Tasmania) as well as several genuine full public consultations and community input into all those existing Master Plans.
Even before this accommodation relocation was formalised, it soon emerged that the GM’s ill-thought out plan, which he simplistically insisted was ‘good town-planning’, involved more than just student accommodation relocation. Behind the scenes he moved quickly to invite and encourage UTas to provide information to support his plans for a full campus move to Inveresk, a distance of 3-4 kilometres from the existing fully operating campus site of 180 acres and associated infrastructure. His intentions are revealed in items listed in an email from him to UTas in December 2012. An example of such items on the list is, “LCC would wish to gain an indication of the future
3 Richard Flanagan, The Mercury, 20 April 2019, pp. 7,
6 development proposed by UTAS at the Inveresk site, and to gain the collaboration of UTAS in developing the Inveresk precinct Plan which will guide development at Inveresk”.
UTas management was quick to take advantage of this encouragement and start its own push. In its December 2012 response to GM Dobrzynski’s email, UTas referred to previous discussions adding that, “the University needs to finalise the matter.” It referred to “tight deadlines” and warned that “If in-principle agreement on Inveresk cannot be reached before Christmas the University will have to look at alternate sites to meet these deadlines.” It must be pointed out here that until July that year the intention had been to build the accommodation at Newnham campus where UTas already ‘owned’/occupied the land, and for which the NRAS funding had been obtained.
Thus, the opportunity was seized by UTas, particularly by VC Peter Rathjen (now at Adelaide) and Provost, Mike Calford (now at ANU), with the latter doing much of the lobbying of politicians and candidates of all parties well in advance of the 2016 federal election. Meanwhile, in order to silence vocal opposition, the GM was able to sideline YPIPA community members by working directly and secretly with the LCC Mayor and the two aldermanic representatives on the Authority. In 2016, he succeeded in getting UTas to sponsor the York Park stadium for an undisclosed amount understood to be lower than the previous 5 year sponsorship by Aurora.
Example 2. i) In early 2016, a senior Commonwealth public servant (who shall be referred to as PB), but acting independently, approached northern UTas management to query the document that they had put forward as their ‘business plan’. This document was/is nothing more than a glossy marketing brochure. Initially the northern UTas representative argued that it was indeed the business case, but PB insisted it was not. After some discussion, and as PB was not to be fobbed off, it was suggested (or he may have requested to speak to someone, it is uncertain at this stage) that he speak with the University’s Hobart-based business manager. It is perhaps noteworthy that the business manager travelled from Hobart to Launceston to talk with PB. Again, when PB insisted that the glossy brochure was not a business plan he received the same response from the business manager that it was. However, as PB persisted on the existence or otherwise of a business plan, the business manager finally admitted, “We don’t have one”.
ii) Similarly, PB also sought the student statistics that UTas would have presumably used to support/underpin their arguments for public funding and land acquisitions. After much running around, PB was eventually told that “there aren’t any”. This accords the experience of another researcher. Not from want of trying, including a trip to Hobart, they were unable to find or obtain current or earlier statistics of student numbers, not even basic Full Time Equivalents (FTE), across the campuses.
Example 3. On Monday 2 October 2017, less than three weeks before VC Rathjen was due to finish up as VC and leave Tasmania, an ordinary meeting of Launceston City Council was attended by some members of the public and twelve well-prepared UTas representatives intending to address the meeting on the controversial Agenda item relating to a LCC-UTas campus relocation land deals. During the morning before the meeting, the aldermen received an email from the LCC Acting General Manager.
The email read: “A robust debate in council that does not result in the required absolute majority will significantly damage relations and our reputation, especially when the university has been organising speakers to attend the meeting supporting the proposal,”
Apart from one alderman, Danny Gibson, the other aldermen and the Mayor were very
keen to give more parcels of land to UTas, still without having carried out any due
diligence (in breach of their code of conduct) on behalf of ratepayers. Alderman Gibson
was incensed at such an instruction from a council official and asked what was the intent
of the email. He also asked about the nature – a convoluted series of “exchanges” - of
7 what the Aldermen were being “asked” to approve. He stated that it “was ludicrous to
have not questioned” the land deals further and “appalling that the council had not
finished its parking study before the land decision was made." He pointed to the haste,
with which the deal was being voted on that day simply as a farewell favour for VC
Rathjen. Referring to the land deals and an upcoming LCC send-off for the VC, Ald
Gibson argued, “I believe if there wasn't a function to celebrate the achievements of the
Vice Chancellor this Thursday in Launceston that we would have negotiated a better
outcome”.
The Mayor tried several times to silence Ald Gibson on this, saying it was a confidential
email. However, Alderman Gibson held his ground, until he finally got an answer
regarding to the nature of what the aldermen were being asked to approve. The eventual
answer from the Acting GM was, “It has been a long process of working to address
the issue of trying to achieve the outcome of the relocation of the university to the
inner city site. I think that through that process, as aldermen have been advised,
there was a point now of an expectation that we had reached an agreement.
For us not to proceed would be something that is regrettable, given the effort that
had gone into it.”
That answer from the Acting GM was a clear indication of the failure by all levels of
government to carry out any due diligence or requirement for UTas to produce modelling,
demonstrated need or a full evidence-based business case. By late 2017-early 2018 it had
become the fall-back position of many politicians and proponents to suggest that the
‘plan’ is/was either too far advanced to halt, or that “it’s a done deal” or similar.
Example 4. On 28 May 2018 four members of a series of community networks that
include businesses, academics, students, tradespeople, retailers, ratepayers, residents and
others, requested a meeting with the new VC, Rufus Black. Black invited two UTas
representatives/lobbyists, Professor David Adams and James McKee, to the meeting.
During the very polite discussions, Professor Adams had as much to say as the VC, Mr
McKee said nothing. Well into the discussions and on the topic of the complete lack of
any evidence, reason or need for the Launceston campus move, Adams, as he spoke,
volunteered this shocking and revealing top level admission of six years of
misrepresentation, academic disregard, negligence and ad hoc actions with the statement
(information that the public was already well aware of) “We are retrospectively trying
to create the logic of this.”
This, in 2018 - after 6 years of machinations and disbursement on associated resources (personnel, equipment, marketing, travel, office space, real estate etc) after millions of dollars of public funds had been promised, with some funds already handed over, land parcels gifted and some land titles granted, and planning scheme flood inundation codes altered - was the best they could come up with! Adams’ words were a full admission that they, UTas and proponents, still had not established justification for relocation, that all their previous claims and actions have indeed been a scam. Furthermore, on 1 March 2019, a full month after their submission to IA, Adams was quoted in the local newspaper, The Examiner: ‘Pro-vice chancellor David Adams said the university had been "working hard to get the evidence” for its transformation project, but “unforeseen challenges had meant a delay to the existing timelines.”
The level of misrepresentation, deception, manipulation, demise of ethical standards, lack of accountability and transparency by UTas and/or those in government responsible for organising and signing MOUs and granting funding has been mind-boggling and continues unabated. Not even the serious damage to the Sandy Bay campus caused by the
8 flood in June 2018, nor the public response to an Open Letter 4 to VC Black was enough to bring about a rethink of the folly of relocating the whole Launceston campus to a flood prone tidal flat – an area that sits below high tide levels, albeit behind levees, but which has to be evacuated, at great expense and effort, every time there’s a flood evacuation warning as there was in June 2016 at a cost to UTas of over $40,000 to evacuate the small campus there.
Moreover, the cost of Launceston relocation is now rumoured to have blown out to well over $400 million, (presumably in part due to the nature of the intended location), while the posited randomly selected number of ‘additional’ students has been reduced from the original figure of 12,500 quoted in 2015-6, to 7,000 in mid-2018 to 1,200 in late 2018. This combination and size of altered projections alone should be enough to negate all MOUs and to force serious, open examination of LCC-UTas methods, funding and efficacy of the all campus relocation plans. However, it has made no difference to the funding promise by politicians and proponents.
No single politician, candidate or party carried out any due diligence or fact checking before supporting the funding promises. Because of the obvious flaws and absence of any need to relocate (quite the contrary, the evidence for remaining at the current campus is overwhelming and fully understood by the public), ad hoc decisions, policy and planning on the run, and absence of any coherent proposal have been ongoing characteristics of the process from the start, a feature also recognised by the public.
In this absence of any due diligence or fact checking by the political class or of any requirement for UTas to produce actual evidence or modelling or full business case, Launceston-based community networks assigned a full academic-level report. Researchers have spoken to many people, politicians of all persuasions, business owners, professionals, tradespeople, academics, students, current and former UTas employees, UTas lobbyists, University Vice Chancellor, administration staff, media/radio hosts, and had numerous discussions and casual conversations with members of the public. The high level of opposition within the general public (80-85% opposed) and within UTas staff (75% opposed in Hobart, approx. 90% opposed in Launceston) and students, has remained high from the start, It has not diminished.
One of the difficulties for any member of the public in trying to deal with this issue, or to expose the misrepresentation and deception (in the legal sense, say as per Aust Consumer Law, or under ‘wilful blindness’ or ‘public interest’) is the constant stream of ad hoc responses, inconsistencies and the almost weekly contradictions that emerge from the UTas Northern Transformation (NTP) office. In addition to that is the secrecy and collusion by the Launceston City Council on matters such as Development Applications and discretionary Planning Scheme Amendments in assisting UTas actions. 5 People who
4 5ee the published Open Letter including all the community social media comments.
The clearest example of this was the successful passing of Amendment 43 to the L’ton Planning Scheme to alter part of the Invermay Flood Inundation Code to allow a previously ‘prohibited category’ development on the tidal zone that sits below high tide level. When the Code was originally put in place, then State Treasury Secretary, Don Challen, was adamant that no further intensification of the area was to occur. In the past 3-4 years the City Council has succeed in weakening the Code to allow full-scale development there (with the associated growth in daily traffic movements, the highest in Tasmania, outside Hobart). The City Council failed to mention to the Planning Commission or to anyone else, that a Flood Modelling Report by BMT, that it, the Council, had commissioned and had already seen several interim versions, was close to final publication at the time of the Amendment 43 Planning Commission hearings. The BMT report is a serious document based on the latest climate change data and flood data, with serious projections (2050, 2090) for flooding in/around Launceston. North and South Esk Rivers Flood Modelling and Mapping UpdateVol1:Technical Report, and Vol 2 Flood mapping, published in Nov 2018, but not released by LCC until 22 January 2019. Several Launceston experts (flooding, estuarine scientist, engineer, emergency personnel) expressed surprise
9 should be checking this issue, are not. Those who should be taking action or are in a position to bring about action are ignoring or dismissing the issue in a wilful abrogation of their responsibility. By not carrying out their own due diligence and/or fact checking, these “self-absorbed” politicians and councillors have rejected accountability and transparency, and most likely breached their Codes of Conduct. Meanwhile UTas misrepresentation, under the guise of ‘transformation’, continues unchecked and undeterred. Indeed, they have created several new positions over the time and appointed a new pro-vice chancellor to oversee the ‘northern transformation’.
Given this situation and the failure by anyone involved to apply and enforce standards, (as per your articles and Geoffrey Watson’s comments about the Tasmanian Integrity Commission being a paper tiger), how does the community go about using the research and the reports to bring honesty and common sense to the issue? 6 A return to the earlier published common-sense UTas plans of refurbishing the current main Launceston campus in conjunction with the Mowbray Precinct Study, at a cost of between $59m to $72m, would release public funds for several important alternative projects needed in Launceston and fully supported by the public.
It is not possible in this letter to cover all the matters of public concern associated with the UTas relocation projects. A full academic-level, peer-reviewed evaluation of the planned campus relocation and UTas’ claims, Evaluative Review of the University of Tasmania Inveresk Precinct Redevelopment Project, by Chris Penna, has been published and sent to relevant people in the hope that they might read it and perhaps take notice of the content and of the misrepresentation and deception perpetuated by UTas and its lobbyists. A further independent academic-level report is in progress.
FURTHER REFERENCES –
1. SECTION ON TRUST, TRANSPARENCY AND SOCIAL LICENCE - EXTRACT FROM AN UPCOMING INDEPENDENT REPORT ON THE UTAS RELOCATION (The Report includes aspects from an ETHICS CENTRE publication)
2. OPEN LETTER TO THE VICE CHANCELLOR, AND SOCIAL MEDIA COMMENTS, JUNE 2018.
3. ARTICLE BY DR M POWELL ON THE NEED FOR “AN INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO UTAS?” 8 JUNE 2018
that the Council even released it publicly it at all, due to the seriousness of the report and the projections. In all its actions the City Council - and the State Government - has given preference to the UTas proposal over everything else.
6 A rethink and a possible reversal on the Hobart STEM centre relocation, which has been with Infrastructure Australia for some time and had reached the final stages, was announced in midJanuary 2019.
10 APPENDIX 1.
TRUST, TRANSPARENCY AND SOCIAL LICENCE: PUBLIC INTEREST AND COMMUNITY CONSULTATION FAILURE (EXTRACT) The UTas relocation proposal has almost no public support. Surveys consistently show that it is opposed by the overwhelming majority of the public and UTas staff and students across Tasmania.7
Neither the University of Tasmania nor the Launceston City Council (LCC/CoL) have social licence for the campus relocation plan. LCC/CoL seems to believe that while it gifts millions of dollars’ worth of land or interest-free loans on the one hand, social licence for the campus relocation can be gained, on the other, by carrying out small, disjointed projects in the MowbrayNewnham area, under the now severely truncated and weakened Northern Suburbs Strategy, misleadingly renamed “Northern Suburbs Revitalisation Plan”. As the Ethics Centre notes, “Too often, social licence is thought to be something that can be purchased, like an offset. Big companies with controversial practices often give out community grants and investments…a social licence…might be seen as a kind of transaction where community acceptance can be bought. Of course, such an approach will often fail precisely because it is conceived as a calculated and cynical pay-off.”8
Social licence has never been earned or ‘granted’ for by UTas for its campus relocations. UTas has never required to provide an impact study or any modelling for the effects of its plans on either the intended location or on the current campuses and the local areas. Although originally intended for resource development projects, the Queensland Govt produced guidelines for preparing a local impact management plan (SIMP). 9 A similar plan should have been a requirement for the UTas relocation plans in Hobart, Launceston and Burnie, where water-front public (local/state govt-owned) land has been given to UTas without any examination of local activities severely impacted/affected or at risk of serious negative impact, and an increase in infrastructure to cater for UTas desires.
The survey-report by the Australian Institute of Company Directors and KPMG on social licence, could well have been written specifically about aspects of the university sector in Australia, and could be seen as pointing the finger directly at the failures of UTas management “Vulnerable stake holders are the ones we have difficulty hearing because their voices are filtered out by layers of management that are using a business-only lens to prioritise their biggest risks…A Social licence must be earned every day.” KPMG p.7 “Social licence is an important and powerful lens to frame trust. It acknowledges the active role that people and communities play in granting ongoing acceptance and approval of how companies – or entire industries conduct their business.(p11) 10 Aggrieved and cynical communities can
Surveys and petitions of the general public, UTas staff and students conducted since 2016, and assessment of social media show up to 85% opposition. Staff at the Launceston campus believe the rate among all staff there is 90%. According to a recent NTEU survey, the rate among Hobart staff to relocations there is 75%.
8 The Ethics Centre, “Ethics Explainer: Social license to operate”, ethics.org.au, 23 January 2018.
9 Lacey, Justine, “Can you legislate a social licence to operate?” The Conversation, 27 February 2013. 10 Australian Institute of Company Directors & KPMG, Maintaining the social licence to operate. 2018 KPMG – AICD Trust Survey”, 2018, pp. 11, 12.
11 withdraw the social licence of organisations that lose or exploit their trust with potentially devastating financial, legal and regulatory impacts. Organisations can no longer view trust as an asset that they can buy or rebuild after a crisis, but one that must be earned and maintained on an ongoing basis. Boards of all sectors are increasingly aware that fundamentally, trust is about relationships, not solely reputation… (p.11) ” We no longer place unquestioning trust in systems and institutions. Instead, trust is more likely to flow between local networks, individuals and peers…” (p. 12) UTas has nothing concrete to offer or give the local Northern Suburbs community in the way of ‘bribes’ or ‘sweeteners’ to win community support, but it has a great deal – in the form of a fully functioning campus and all that it entails - to take away, so gaining social licence is difficult, if not impossible. UTas management has made, and continues to make, endless wild promises to its staff and the public of a rosy transformed future. While limited sections of the public (strikingly and unashamedly closely associated with each other) have accepted the UTas spin and propaganda, the wider community recognises the absence of any modelling or supporting evidence, and it recognises that the main part of the UTas ‘spin’ or ‘case’ is framed in verbose general education/pedagogy unrelated to location. That is, UTas’s case is largely location-neutral, a fact well-understood by the public.
The proponents of the relocation plan have given no consideration to the destruction of local amenity and/or liveability. They have ignored all previous extensive community consultations around Inveresk Precinct land use. Museum Search Conference, genuine community input and listening by YPIPA, to community and tenants…….Folder with letters and submissions, From the time UTas management arrived on the scene, the community (as represented by YPIPA community members, Inveresk precinct tenants) began to lose any say, and worse, were push aside. UTas and other proponents of the relocation plan continue to ignore/disregard the intent of the GHD 2006 Flood Study, the Deed and the Flood Inundation Code, and even the latest BMT Flood study, 2018. Regrettably, on all aspects of the relocation issue, the public is justified in its suspicions and mistrust of UTas and CoL, The wider community is fully aware of the deficiencies and problems associated with Inveresk. The community also recognises the quality and value of the current Mowbray-Newnham campus/location combined with the long-term sustainability and cost effectiveness of remaining there. The vast majority of the population has not been seduced by the endless stream of media releases, media photo opportunities, marketing presentations and false gestures posturing as ‘consultation’ by UTas in its effort to gain or claim social licence. In this UTas has failed spectacularly.
Moreover, in their wilful determination and enthusiasm for their relocation project, UTas and CoL have also failed to abide by good governance principles. Governance is “the process and culture that guide the activities of an organisation beyond its basic legal obligations”. Good governance inc Includes, but is not limited to, “acting with the highest ethical standards…fostering trusting and respectful relationships, showing a commitment to risk management…following a transparent and accountable decision-making process…” 11 In their ongoing planning chaos, their failure to
11 Tasmanian DPAC, Good Governance Guide
12 abide by the highest standards of risk management, and the absence of transparency and accountability, both UTas management and CoL have sacrificed the principles of good governance.
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