P. O. Box 513 Launceston Tasmania 7250 ● Tel. 0428 137 050 ● email li82303@bigpond.net.au28 September 2020
Michael Stretton General Manager City of Launceston Council Town Hall St John Street LAUNCESTON TAS 7250
By email to contactus@launceston.tas.gov.au
Dear Sir,
Re: Representation DA0321/2020 2-4 Invermay Road Invermay Education and Occasional Care Use - Construction of four storey learning and teaching building incorporating the relocate Riawunna Aboriginal Centre, meeting and consultation rooms, workspaces and student breakout areas, staff and student facilities including toilets, kitchen spaces and parenting rooms; demolition of minor outbuildings, car park and kerb and pavement; associated landscape works including removal of one tree.
We write to you again to present important information regarding the inadvisability of relocating the Newnham campus of the University of Tasmania (UTas), a project named by UTas as the Inveresk Precinct Redevelopment (IPR) as part of its Northern Tasmanian Transformation Program (NTP). The IPR is a major component of the Commonwealth Government’s Launceston City Deal (LCD), significantly funded by the Commonwealth Government, Tasmanian Government, and the ratepayers of the City of Launceston Council.
Northern Tasmanian Networks Partners & Associates opposes the relocation of the University of Tasmania Campus from Newnham to the Inveresk and Willis Street floodplains, which will be subjected to increasing threat from climate change affecting sea level rises in the Tamar/Esk estuary, and further threatened by predicted seismic activity that could cause the collapse/damage to the levee system. We are also concerned that this new UTas infrastructure and also existing infrastructure such as the flood levees that give some protection but mainly give time to effect orderly evacuation, and bridges crossing the North Esk River, may be damaged or compromised by untimely seismic events, and accordingly refer Councillors to the many reports it has previously commissioned that warn of inevitable seismic activity.
It is also with a note of irony, that finally past rumours of TAFE retreating from the CBD to its campus at Alanvale has now greeted readership of The Examiner newspaper on 15 October 2019 with the headline TAFE SHIFT Launceston CBD campus to close, relocate to Alanvale site. The AEU and the Editor of The Examiner may well ask “If the university is spending all this money to move into town, then why is TasTAFE doing the opposite” and “It seems bizarre that at a time when the University of Tasmania is planning its move closer to Launceston’s CBD, TasTAFE is plotting to escape it”.
Councillors, you may well mimic what those in the community ask “How will the move tie in with UTAS’ plans?
Other questions being asked by citizens of Launceston includes “Is this part of another scheme or plot known also by Councillors, that City of Launceston Council will finally announce that it will be now handing over the QVMAG’s Stone Building at Inveresk to UTas and relocate QVMAG to the soon-to-be-vacated TAFE building next door to QVMAG’s Wellington Street campus”?
We encourage Councillors to rethink their previous views and if in doubt to specifically write to all ratepayers of the City to seek their direct view on this project or indicate if there are other higher priority infrastructure projects such as a new Tamar River bridge that could connect University Drive to Riverside, thereby creating a completely new dynamic for road and traffic issues and solutions for the Launceston region.
Introduction
In May 2018, I headed a delegation of 4 people to meet with the University of Tasmania Vice Chancellor, Professor Rufus Black.
We are a small group of concerned Launceston citizens, but are confident our views reflect widespread community opinion.
The Inveresk Precinct is an unstable, susceptible tidal floodplain, further impacted by the presence of a seismic fault line along the course of the North Esk River. Launceston’s recently rebuilt flood levee system, does not prohibit flooding of the city as commonly mis-understood, as all that it can do is mitigate flood inundation for most flood events.
In our community, climate change is not being recognised as having a serious impact on Launceston’s flood plains. This impact is real, and reduces the effectiveness of Launceston’s flood levee barricades. It is not possible to construct a levee system that can guard against all potential floods, and it is not a question of if the levees will be breached, but when .
In the latter part of 2018, we briefed researcher Mr. Chris Penna, to undertake a comprehensive Evaluative Review of the University of Tasmania Inveresk Precinct Redevelopment Project. The development of the Evaluative Review for which the last two/three sections are still in progress (and presently documented in point form), is an on-going exercise. We are, however, able to provide you with our latest updated report, Version 3, which we have released (see Media Release May 10 2019) and attach here, for your information.
Version 3 has the status of being peer-reviewed, and takes into consideration:
• The Updated Flood Modelling and Mapping reports from BMT consultants – Nov 2018
• The ‘reported’ revisions of key UTas Inveresk Precinct Redevelopment projections – Nov 2018
• The discovered removal of the UTas EDERNT project/funding proposal public document from its website, and the release, by the new UTas V-C Professor Black, of the November 2018 UTas Strategic Direction paper
• The submission on January 31 of the confidential UTas Northern Transformation Program detailed business case to Infrastructure Australia
• An additional floodplain management reference - Bewsher and Maddocks 2003
2 • Incorporation of the estimated residential and commercial direct tangible costs for Invermay for a 0.5% Annual Exceedence Probability Event;
• Other aspects related legal liability in the context of climate change
• An introductory section of ‘Findings’ from the Review, which can act as an Executive Summary.
Prior to the 2016 election, based on nothing more than a UTas marketing brochure, the ALP
Opposition accepted and supported the UTas NTP/IPR proposal. This forced a reluctant LNP and
sitting Bass Liberal Member, Mr Andrew Nikolic to match the ALP unevaluated commitment of
$130m which was sought in the marketing document. Mr Nikolic lost his seat at that election, and
his successor, Labor Member Mr Ross Hart was elected. Although we managed to gain some
understanding and sympathy for our views, Mr Hart was somewhat powerless during his term to
have the decision reviewed, as by that time the siting Liberal Government had concluded their
Launceston City Deal Agreement and forwarded their funding contribution to the Tasmanian
Government. Subsequently the project and its processes have proved highly problematic, and
potentially unsustainable from several perspectives.
At the 2019 election, Mr Hart was replaced by Liberal Member Mrs Bridget Archer, and the
Morrison Government returned.
The Latest Publicity
After months of unexplained delay, on 1 March 2019
the UTas Pro Vice Chancellor, Professor
David Adams, gave an update on the Inveresk campus development application. The much-
anticipated Development Application for the UTas Inveresk campus has already been delayed
twelve months and is not expected now until at least June 2019. Admitting, “working hard to get the
evidence” for its transformation project (a new take on an earlier admission “trying to retrospectively create the logic”).
Professor Adams admitted it was now “unforeseen challenges” that meant further delays to the
“existing timelines”, such as : A large number of “existing” infrastructure projects in the pipeline for Tasmania Launceston is home to some significant private investment The importance of delivering on a promise (by UTas) to “maximise the economic benefits from this project for Tasmanian businesses”
But he makes no mention or admission that : The media had reported near the end of 2018 that the budget has blown out from $260 million to greater than $400 million (the Vice Chancellor has privately disputed this, but nothing publicly), and the original projected student numbers have been reduced from greater than 12,000 to less than 1,200.
It has been realised that the Planning Scheme now appears to have conditions that prohibit essential aspects of the project and will need to be amended by statute in order to allow the UTas developments on the flood plain sites.
Continued unresolvable car parking and traffic congestion in the central area will impact on the operation of the relocated campus and also potentially inhibit approvals.
Flood mitigation risk (not to mention the seismic risk overlay and revised flood risk revealed
in CoL’s latest commissioned BMT Flood Modelling Report) And “things like that” – Professor David Adams, 1 March 2019.
3 This all means:
The relocation will take more than five years instead of promised three.
The student intake during this period will presumably have nowhere to study; or will have to put up with alleged substandard facilities at the existing Newnham campus; or go elsewhere (interstate, overseas or online); or not be educated at all.
And courtesy of the Covid 19 emergency, overseas students may now never return in the numbers previously favoured.
Sycophantic brayings from the editor of the local newspaper, Launceston Chamber of Commerce
and a “hopeful” Launceston City Council all fall in line to try really hard to trumpet that this project is
worthwhile and justifies public support. Infrastructure spending should not be used for a campus
relocation as this is not truly what should be defined as infrastructure work.
Our Research
1. Despite the Launceston City Council rhetoric, there continues to be negative levels of genuine community support. Local politicians now privately admit that the threat by UTas and disseminated by the previous CoL GM - that unless they had agreed to the relocation proposal, they would be faced with the ominous possibility of a reduced or no tertiary UTas presence in Launceston.
2. A project seeking more than $100m of federal funding should have by law been exhaustively evaluated by Infrastructure Australia (IA) before being approved and funded. In January 2018, the promised $130m funding, now, handed over, was released by PM Turnbull. After considerable political pressure a confidential ‘Strategic Business Case’ was belatedly submitted to IA on 31 January 2019.
3. The two key instigators, the now-disgraced UTas V-C Rathjen and City of Launceston GM Dobrzynski, had both left Tasmania by October 2017. The replacement V-C, Professor Black reviewed the IPR. Consequently, we understand that the following revisions to two key projections have been made:
• That the projected IPR project cost has been understandably increased, meaning any additional funds required must be sourced by UTas and/or the size of the project be cut down;
• That the number of new (additional) students during the first 10-year period at Inveresk, has been revised down from ≥12,000 to around ≤1,200, and that was before the Covid-19 pandemic struck !!
4. V-C Black sponsored a (Nov 2018) ‘UTas Strategic Directions’ paper which broadly directed future UTas developments. The importance of a NTP in meeting educational, social and economic goals is acknowledged, but interestingly is locationally neutral for Launceston – the IPR is not mentioned. The increased IPR costs are likely to contribute to a significant budget deficit, although UTas aims to generate operational savings of $30m per year for the next 5 years. The Development Application for the IPR, overdue and having been expected in November 2018, was not submitted to CoL Council and accepted by CoL Council until 1 July 2019.
5. The IPR now appears ‘suspended’ because UTas has pushed original timelines out so far as to create a development hiatus which unfortunately has prevented other non-UTas infrastructure projects for the region of greater community interest and economic benefit, being promoted and considered.
6. UTas has refused to accept the folly of development on the flood plain site (estuarine tidal zone that sits below high tide level), which is manifestly inappropriate, risky, expensive, and potentially uninsurable (FM Global indicated they would not insure). These factors are endorsed by geotechnical/seismic advice from eminent experts including Geoscience Australia and GHD consultants. 4 7. The City of Launceston (CoL) commissioned and released ‘North and South Esk Rivers Flood Modelling and Mapping Update’ reports by BMT. The renewed levees were designed to protect from an Annual Exceedence Probability (AEP) of 0.5%, (inaccurately referred to as a 1 in 200 year flood), based on a 2008 study. The more accurate 2018 BMT report shows that if there was an Annual Exceedence Probability 0.5% flood event now, the levees would be overtopped, and Inveresk would suffer a 2-5 m deep flood of hazard class 5 – defined as Unsafe for vehicles and people; all buildings vulnerable to structural damage. These BMT reports must be of serious concern to ratepayers and must give pause to and reconsideration of the UTas Inveresk Precinct Redevelopment. As the CoL commissioned the reports, is the owner/manager of much of Inveresk, and has gifted Inveresk public land to UTas, it is the responsibility of the CoL and its Council to take the initiative in acting publicly on the 2018 BMT reports. If UTas decides/is allowed to continue with the Inveresk/Willis St constructions, there will be additional $m’s set of assets constructed behind the levees, and there is likely to be pressure from UTas to raise and strengthen the levees – a very expensive undertaking which is currently the responsibility of CoL.
8. Former State Treasury official, (Mr Don Challen), was a strident opponent of any further building intensification within the Flood Inundation zone, including at Inveresk Precinct. This was in part due to his concerns of an increase in government compensation liability, should the area be flooded.
9. The proposal is contrary to International Best Practice Principles, lacks peer review, and clearly warrants a designated adjournment, while an independent review is undertaken, in which all of the evidence relating to the issues and alternatives is fully, openly and quantitatively included, and considered.
10. More than a year ago on 20 th June 2019, Prof. Rufus Black updated the NTP to Launceston Staff, with a much-reduced footprint for buildings on the Inveresk/Willis St sites, further extended timelines, and a large car park proposed on the low-lying Glebe Farm across the North Esk River, which along with Tas Institute greenhouses and experimental simulated field environments, placed on stilted platforms to avoid almost daily tidal inundations. This proved to be a somewhat premature announcement because the owner of Glebe Farm quickly announced there was “no deal” and UTas cast its eyes to engaging former Labor Premier Paul Lennon as its consultant to negotiate purchase of the entire Invermay block of Invermay Road, Bedford Street, Holbrook Street and Dry Street, to be cleared for a car park !!
11. In early July 2019, Infrastructure Australia finally placed the project on its priority list.
12. UTas announced that a Stage 1 Development Application entailing just one new building at Inveresk and a footbridge over the North Esk River, had been lodged with CoL Council prior to the ‘end of June’, however this application was a non-compliant Development Application.
13. Later, CoL Planning Department revealed that a Development Application was presented to CoL on 1 July 2019 (Ref. DA 0315/2019) by a Planning Consultant, Ireneinc (Planning Tasmania Pty Ltd) representing UTas, however the application lodgement was not valid due to a large number of yet-to-be-answered questions forwarded to Ireneinc by CoL contracted planning assessment consultant. The statutory advertising period was delayed for several weeks waiting for satisfactory information to be provided, before it could be finally processed and determined for approval.
14. CoL Consultant Assessment Planner admitted that only parts of the overall UTas development could be progressed because the majority of the components of the development would require lengthy planning scheme amendments as such uses were prohibited by the CoL Planning Scheme. This seems to have been proven to be false,
5 because now this Development Application DA0321 at 2 Invermay Road and a second, concurrent Development Application DA0320 at 7 Willis Street are now being sought with no mention of a Planning Scheme being require. It is interesting that two student residential developments proposed at both Inveresk and Willis Street sites, are not part of these applications. The absence of nearby student accommodation facilities will seriously hamper the success of the campus, and create added traffic and transport issues whilst students travel from remote accommodation sites in the northern suburbs to the campus proposed.
Having reviewed all available evidence relating to the issues, and alternatives concerning the proposed relocation to Inveresk, and the original redevelopment plans for the present Newnham Campus, we conclude that it is inadvisable, in fact, irresponsible, to further develop the Inveresk/ Willis St campus in the face of the unacceptable risks identified. The cost of compensating damage will outweigh the cost of the investment to be made in establishing the campus.
The Way Forward:
Recover the budget, deliver on time, deliver a safe and secure outcome
Revive the original UTas proposal to refurbish and expand Newnham (refer to UTas Newnham Urban Design Framework, Aug 2011 )
Preserve and enhance the existing community infrastructure of the Northern Suburbs ( refer to Mowbray District Precinct Plan Dec 2013/Jan 2014 )
Reallocate the original (lesser) budget of $260 million to addressing alleged shortfalls in the
Newnham campus facilities, potentially reducing the budget allocation for the Relocation Project.
Recover or regain the three-year program and deliver the important economic benefits on time.
We attach here our Evaluative Review report, Version 3, March 2019, for your information.
We encourage further communications and continued dialogue in working together for the benefit of our community, and accordingly would be very pleased to receive any response you may wish to make to the Evaluative Review, in particular relative to the ethical dilemma we have identified.
Yours faithfully,
Lionel J Morrell
Lionel J. Morrell For Northern Tasmanian Network Partners and Associates
Copy to Ian J N Routley, Leigh Murrell, Jillian Koshin, Chris Penna .
Enc.
Report -
EVALUATIVE REVIEW OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA INVERESK PRECINCT REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT Chris Penna, March 2019 - Version 3
6 ATTACHMENT
SUMMATION OF RESEARCH WORKSHOP attended by members of Northern Tasmanian Network Partners & Associates :
THE STANDING OF ETHICS IN RELATION TO UTas INVERESK PRECINCT REDEVELOPMENT PROJECT June 2019
Two articles by John Hewson published in the Launceston Examiner, (28 December 2018 and 25 January 2019) raised issues of considerable concern for many Australians. In his articles, one of which was head-lined “Australia’s in the midst of moral, ethical decline” Dr Hewson talked about “trust deficit” and “a longer term erosion of the moral and ethical standards across society, as well as their application and enforcement”.
He pointed out that the loss of public confidence is not only with our politicians, political processes but also with a broad range of institutions – “churches, banks (and more broadly in business) various sports, the RSL, and numerous authorities ranging from the police, judicial processes through to a host of regulatory authorities…ASIC/APRA and even the Reserve Bank)”’. Geoffrey Watson QC expressed similar concerns and a “falling trust in politicians” in a local ABC radio interview in November 2018 and in subsequent interviews. He described Tasmania’s Integrity Commission as a toothless tiger. He talked about transparency, hidden agendas, secrecy and the influence of lobbyists on politicians in Tasmania.1
Dr Hewson and Geoffrey Watson didn’t include universities in the list of institutions, but in a recent ABC radio interview (5 July 2019) well-known journalist, Ray Martin did mention universities. He talked about the cult of secrecy with governments and public servants disliking “light being shone in dark corners”. He had addressed university students earlier in the day and explained how he had told them that “we can’t have the sort of open, free democracy that we have don’t have watch dogs, if people aren’t watching, not just governments, but public servants and parliament and universities etc…big organisations, all the institutions…all need to be scrutinised.”
In an ABC radio interview in Tasmanian in 2018 about the Tamar Valley Peace Festival, VC Prof. Rufus Black also talked about integrity and “breach of trust” and “a kind of stain that’s been spreading across Australian society, in politics, then went into churches, businesses, as we’ve been seeing recently with the royal commission.” The Ethics Centre has written about social licence and how “big companies with controversial practice often give out community grants and investments” in an effort to buy “social licence’ and “community acceptance”, in an approach that the Ethics Centre refers to as “a calculated and cynical payoff”.2
In Tasmania, there are serious public concerns about the actions and culture around the University of Tasmania (UTas). UTas is a cossetted monopoly in Tasmania. Under the management of the past 6-7 years, a culture of misrepresentation, deception, real estate matters and staff intimidation has evolved. In Launceston, this has occurred as the result of combined Launceston City Council (LCC)-UTas’ management ambition and lobbying to secure millions of dollars in public funding, including $300 million to relocate the Launceston and Burnie main campuses (consisting of $150 m from the Federal government, $150 m from the Tasmanian government, plus gifts of several parcels of public land from the Launceston and Burnie City Councils).
1 2 See also ABC radio news transcript, 7 March 2019, comments by Geoffrey Watson.
The Ethics Centre, “Ethics Explainer: Social license to operate”, ethics.org.au, 23 January 2018.
7 From the start, the plan for the relocation of the entire Launceston campus (concomitant with and mirroring the Burnie and Hobart plans) away from a safe, secure fully-operating campus to a site only 34 kilometres away - on an estuarine flood inundation zone that sits below high tide level, and with severe traffic and parking issues - has lacked any significant supporting evidence or academic rigour. The plan is full of obvious inherent flaws, ongoing inconsistencies and planning ‘on the run’. In other words, it is/has been a shambles. These matters were recently the subject of a highly critical article by Richard Flanagan in the Hobart Mercury.3
Since 2012, the process has involved a lengthy, convoluted series of machinations and ad hoc reactionary actions and responses. Furthermore, it has involved a complete rejection of community opinion as well as serious intimidation of UTas staff who objected or criticised the plans. In the push to obtain funding promises in the lead up to the 2016 federal election, UTas, LCC and lobbyists operated, and continue to do so, outside ethical, integrity and academic standards. The lobbying and propaganda were thorough and highly successful. Outlandish claims used to support the Launceston campus move to Inveresk, such as the projected enrolment of an additional 12,500 students, (10,000 of whom would, they claimed, be from Tasmania – a statistical impossibility) combined with threats that the northern section of the university would close if it didn’t move to Inveresk, not only went unchallenged, but they were accepted by all levels of government, the major parties and most politicians.
After much assistance and ‘coaching’, UTas eventually submitted a ‘final’ business case to Infrastructure Australia (IA). This was right on the final deadline it had been given, 31 January 2019, potentially it seems, for routine and expedient approval post 2019 election. It appears that this UTas proposal by-passed Stages 1 and 2 of the IA assessment process, to go straight to Stage 3 where it was evaluated by IA.
The trust deficit, and the erosion of moral and ethical standards discussed by Dr Hewson, Geoffrey Watson QC and others are applicable to this situation in Tasmania. It might also be noteworthy that the three main instigators behind the Tasmanian plans, and the associated degeneration of ethics, integrity and honesty, and the sheer success of Illusory Truth Effect, - LCC GM Dobrzynski, VC Rathjen and Provost Calford - have all since left Tasmania for greener pastures. (Sep ’17, Oct ’17, Jan-Feb ’18 respectively)]\
Trying to condense the issue into as few pages as possible but it is not an easy task, given the nature and volume of material involved. The following four examples might be the easiest way to sum up the misrepresentation, deception and due diligence failure within UTas and LCC and the cosy relationship between them, that have been features of this matter. Sections marked in bold in are direct quotes.
Example 1. The plan was initiated around mid-2012 by the then LCC General Manager (GM), Robert Dobrzynski, when he started working behind the scenes to achieve his aim and to encourage UTas, to change the original intended location – the UTas Newnham campus – of its planned NRAS funded student accommodation. The GM’s enticement involved ‘giving’ a parcel of public land at Inveresk to UTas for the accommodation building. He ignored the existing high-level Master Plans for both Inveresk Precinct, the Mowbray Precinct sections of the Greater Launceston Plan and the major plans for the Mowbray-Newnham campus. He also ignored the legally constituted York Park Inveresk Precinct Authority, (YPIPA) its 4 community members and senior state public servant member (head of Events Tasmania) as well as several genuine full public consultations and community input into all those existing Master Plans.
Richard Flanagan, The Mercury, 20 April 2019, pp. 7,
8 Even before this accommodation relocation was formalised, it soon emerged that the GM’s ill-thought out plan, which he simplistically insisted was ‘good town-planning’, involved more than just student accommodation relocation. Behind the scenes he moved quickly to invite and encourage UTas to provide information to support his plans for a full campus move to Inveresk, a distance of 3-4 kilometres from the existing fully operating campus site of 180 acres and associated infrastructure. His intentions are revealed in items listed in an email from him to UTas in December 2012. An example of such items on the list is, “LCC would wish to gain an indication of the future development proposed by UTAS at the Inveresk site, and to gain the collaboration of UTAS in developing the Inveresk precinct Plan which will guide development at Inveresk”.
UTas management was quick to take advantage of this encouragement and start its own push. In its December 2012 response to GM Dobrzynski’s email, UTas referred to previous discussions adding that, “the University needs to finalise the matter.” It referred to “tight deadlines” and warned that “If in-principle agreement on Inveresk cannot be reached before Christmas the University will have to look at alternate sites to meet these deadlines.” It must be pointed out here that until July that year the intention had been to build the accommodation at Newnham campus where UTas already ‘owned’/occupied the land, and for which the NRAS funding had been obtained.
Thus, the opportunity was seized by UTas, particularly by VC Peter Rathjen (now at Adelaide) and Provost, Mike Calford (now at ANU), with the latter doing much of the lobbying of politicians and candidates of all parties well in advance of the 2016 federal election. Meanwhile, in order to silence vocal opposition, the GM was able to sideline YPIPA community members by working directly and secretly with the LCC Mayor and the two aldermanic representatives on the Authority. In 2016, he succeeded in getting UTas to sponsor the York Park stadium for an undisclosed amount understood to be lower than the previous 5 year sponsorship by Aurora.
Example 2. i) In early 2016, a senior Commonwealth public servant (who shall be referred to as PB), but acting independently, approached northern UTas management to query the document that they had put forward as their ‘business plan’. This document was/is nothing more than a glossy marketing brochure. Initially the northern UTas representative argued that it was indeed the business case, but PB insisted it was not. After some discussion, and as PB was not to be fobbed off, it was suggested (or he may have requested to speak to someone, it is uncertain at this stage) that he speak with the University’s Hobart-based business manager. It is perhaps noteworthy that the business manager travelled from Hobart to Launceston to talk with PB. Again, when PB insisted that the glossy brochure was not a business plan he received the same response from the business manager that it was. However, as PB persisted on the existence or otherwise of a business plan, the business manager finally admitted, “We don’t have one”.
ii) Similarly, PB also sought the student statistics that UTas would have presumably used to support/underpin their arguments for public funding and land acquisitions. After much running around, PB was eventually told that “there aren’t any”. This accords the experience of another researcher. Not from want of trying, including a trip to Hobart, they were unable to find or obtain current or earlier statistics of student numbers, not even basic Full Time Equivalents (FTE), across the campuses.
Example 3. On Monday 2 October 2017, less than three weeks before VC Rathjen was due to finish up as VC and leave Tasmania, an ordinary meeting of Launceston City Council was attended by some members of the public and twelve well-prepared UTas representatives intending to address the meeting on the controversial Agenda item relating to a LCC-UTas campus relocation land deals. During the morning before the meeting, the aldermen received an email from the LCC Acting General Manager.
9 The email read: “A robust debate in council that does not result in the required absolute majority will significantly damage relations and our reputation, especially when the university has been organising speakers to attend the meeting supporting the proposal,”
Apart from one alderman, Danny Gibson, the other aldermen and the Mayor were very keen to give
more parcels of land to UTas, still without having carried out any due diligence (in breach of their code
of conduct) on behalf of ratepayers. Alderman Gibson was incensed at such an instruction from a
council official and asked what was the intent of the email. He also asked about the nature – a
convoluted series of “exchanges” - of what the Aldermen were being “asked” to approve. He stated that
it “was ludicrous to have not questioned” the land deals further and “appalling that the council had not
finished its parking study before the land decision was made." He pointed to the haste, with which the
deal was being voted on that day simply as a farewell favour for VC Rathjen. Referring to the land deals
and an upcoming LCC send-off for the VC, Ald Gibson argued, “I believe if there wasn't a function to
celebrate the achievements of the Vice Chancellor this Thursday in Launceston that we would have
negotiated a better outcome”.
The Mayor tried several times to silence Ald Gibson on this, saying it was a confidential email.
However, Alderman Gibson held his ground, until he finally got an answer regarding to the nature of
what the aldermen were being asked to approve. The eventual answer from the Acting GM was, “It has
been a long process of working to address the issue of trying to achieve the outcome of the
relocation of the university to the inner city site. I think that through that process, as aldermen
have been advised, there was a point now of an expectation that we had reached an agreement.
For us not to proceed would be something that is regrettable, given the effort that had gone into
it.”
That answer from the Acting GM was a clear indication of the failure by all levels of government to
carry out any due diligence or requirement for UTas to produce modelling, demonstrated need or a full
evidence-based business case. By late 2017-early 2018 it had become the fall-back position of many
politicians and proponents to suggest that the ‘plan’ is/was either too far advanced to halt, or that “it’s a
done deal” or similar.
Example 4. On 28 May 2018 four members of a series of community networks that include businesses,
academics, students, tradespeople, retailers, ratepayers, residents and others, requested a meeting with
the new VC, Rufus Black. Black invited two UTas representatives/lobbyists, Professor David Adams
and James McKee, to the meeting. During the very polite discussions, Professor Adams had as much to
say as the VC, Mr McKee said nothing. Well into the discussions and on the topic of the complete lack
of any evidence, reason or need for the Launceston campus move, Adams, as he spoke, volunteered this
=shocking and revealing top level admission of six years of misrepresentation, academic disregard,
negligence and ad hoc actions with the statement (information that the public was already well aware of)
“We are retrospectively trying to create the logic of this.”
This, in 2018 - after 6 years of machinations and disbursement on associated resources (personnel, equipment, marketing, travel, office space, real estate etc) after millions of dollars of public funds had been promised, with some funds already handed over, land parcels gifted and some land titles granted, and planning scheme flood inundation codes altered - was the best they could come up with! Adams’ words were a full admission that they, UTas and proponents, still had not established justification for relocation, that all their previous claims and actions have indeed been a scam. Furthermore, on 1 March 2019, a full month after their submission to IA, Adams was quoted in the local newspaper, The Examiner: ‘Pro-vice chancellor David Adams said the university had been "working hard to get the evidence” for its transformation project, but “unforeseen challenges had meant a delay to the existing timelines.”
10 The level of misrepresentation, deception, manipulation, demise of ethical standards, lack of accountability and transparency by UTas and/or those in government responsible for organising and signing MOUs and granting funding has been mind-boggling and continues unabated. Not even the serious damage to the Sandy Bay campus caused by the flood in June 2018, nor the public response to an Open Letter 4 to VC Black was enough to bring about a rethink of the folly of relocating the whole Launceston campus to a flood prone tidal flat – an area that sits below high tide levels, albeit behind levees, but which has to be evacuated, at great expense and effort, every time there’s a flood evacuation warning as there was in June 2016 at a cost to UTas of over $40,000 to evacuate the small campus there.
Moreover, the cost of Launceston relocation is now rumoured to have blown out to well over $400 million, (presumably in part due to the nature of the intended location), while the posited randomly selected number of ‘additional’ students has been reduced from the original figure of 12,500 quoted in 2015-6, to 7,000 in mid-2018 to 1,200 in late 2018. This combination and size of altered projections alone should be enough to negate all MOUs and to force serious, open examination of LCC-UTas methods, funding and efficacy of the all campus relocation plans. However, it has made no difference to the funding promise by politicians and proponents.
No single politician, candidate or party carried out any due diligence or fact checking before supporting the funding promises. Because of the obvious flaws and absence of any need to relocate (quite the contrary, the evidence for remaining at the current campus is overwhelming and fully understood by the public), ad hoc decisions, policy and planning on the run, and absence of any coherent proposal have been ongoing characteristics of the process from the start, a feature also recognised by the public.
In this absence of any due diligence or fact checking by the political class or of any requirement for UTas to produce actual evidence or modelling or full business case, Launceston-based community networks assigned a full academic-level report. Researchers have spoken to many people, politicians of all persuasions, business owners, professionals, tradespeople, academics, students, current and former UTas employees, UTas lobbyists, University Vice Chancellor, administration staff, media/radio hosts, and had numerous discussions and casual conversations with members of the public. The high level of opposition within the general public (80-85% opposed) and within UTas staff (75% opposed in Hobart, approx. 90% opposed in Launceston) and students, has remained high from the start, It has not diminished.
One of the difficulties for any member of the public in trying to deal with this issue, or to expose the misrepresentation and deception (in the legal sense, say as per Aust Consumer Law, or under ‘wilful blindness’ or ‘public interest’) is the constant stream of ad hoc responses, inconsistencies and the almost weekly contradictions that emerge from the UTas Northern Transformation (NTP) office. In addition to that is the secrecy and collusion by the Launceston City Council on matters such as Development Applications and discretionary Planning Scheme Amendments in assisting UTas actions. 5 People who
4 5B see the published Open Letter including all the community social media comments.
The clearest example of this was the successful passing of Amendment 43 to the L’ton Planning Scheme to alter part of the Invermay Flood Inundation Code to allow a previously ‘prohibited category’ development on the tidal zone that sits below high tide level. When the Code was originally put in place, then State Treasury Secretary, Don Challen, was adamant that no further intensification of the area was to occur. In the past 3-4 years the City Council has succeed in weakening the Code to allow full-scale development there (with the associated growth in daily traffic movements, the highest in Tasmania, outside Hobart). The City Council failed to mention to the Planning Commission or to anyone else, that a Flood Modelling Report by BMT, that it, the Council, had commissioned and had already seen several interim versions, was close to final publication at the time of the Amendment 43 Planning Commission hearings. The BMT report is a serious document based on the latest climate change data and flood data, with serious projections (2050, 2090) for flooding in/around Launceston. North and South Esk Rivers Flood Modelling and Mapping
11 should be checking this issue, are not. Those who should be taking action or are in a position to bring about action are ignoring or dismissing the issue in a wilful abrogation of their responsibility. By not carrying out their own due diligence and/or fact checking, these “self-absorbed” politicians and councillors have rejected accountability and transparency, and most likely breached their Codes of Conduct. Meanwhile UTas misrepresentation, under the guise of ‘transformation’, continues unchecked and undeterred. Indeed, they have created several new positions over the time and appointed a new provice chancellor to oversee the ‘northern transformation’.
Given this situation and the failure by anyone involved to apply and enforce standards, (as per your articles and Geoffrey Watson’s comments about the Tasmanian Integrity Commission being a paper tiger), how does the community go about using the research and the reports to bring honesty and common sense to the issue? 6 A return to the earlier published common-sense UTas plans of refurbishing the current main Launceston campus in conjunction with the Mowbray Precinct Study, at a cost of between $59m to $72m, would release public funds for several important alternative projects needed in Launceston and fully supported by the public.It is not possible in this letter to cover all the matters of public concern associated with the UTas relocation projects. A full academic-level, peer-reviewed evaluation of the planned campus relocation and UTas’ claims, Evaluative Review of the University of Tasmania Inveresk Precinct Redevelopment Project, by Chris Penna, has been published and sent to relevant people in the hope that they might read it and perhaps take notice of the content and of the misrepresentation and deception perpetuated by UTas and its lobbyists. A further independent academic-level report is in progress.
FURTHER REFERENCES –
1. SECTION ON TRUST, TRANSPARENCY AND SOCIAL LICENCE - EXTRACT FROM AN UPCOMING INDEPENDENT REPORT ON THE UTAS RELOCATION (The Report includes aspects from an ETHICS CENTRE publication)
2. OPEN LETTER TO THE VICE CHANCELLOR, AND SOCIAL MEDIA COMMENTS, JUNE 2018.
3. ARTICLE BY DR M POWELL ON THE NEED FOR “AN INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO UTAS?” 8 JUNE 2018
UpdateVol1:Technical Report, and Vol 2 Flood mapping, published in Nov 2018, but not released by LCC until 22 January 2019. Several Launceston experts (flooding, estuarine scientist, engineer, emergency personnel) expressed surprise that the Council even released it publicly it at all, due to the seriousness of the report and the projections. In all its actions the City Council - and the State Government - has given preference to the UTas proposal over everything else.
6 A rethink and a possible reversal on the Hobart STEM centre relocation, which has been with Infrastructure Australia for some time and had reached the final stages, was announced in mid-January 2019.
12 APPENDIX 1.
TRUST, TRANSPARENCY AND SOCIAL LICENCE: PUBLIC INTEREST AND COMMUNITY CONSULTATION FAILURE (EXTRACT)
The UTas relocation proposal has almost no public support. Surveys consistently show that it is opposed by the overwhelming majority of the public and UTas staff and students across Tasmania.7
Neither the University of Tasmania nor the Launceston City Council (LCC/CoL) have social licence for the campus relocation plan. LCC/CoL seems to believe that while it gifts millions of dollars’ worth of land or interest-free loans on the one hand, social licence for the campus relocation can be gained, on the other, by carrying out small, disjointed projects in the Mowbray-Newnham area, under the now severely truncated and weakened Northern Suburbs Strategy, misleadingly renamed “Northern Suburbs Revitalisation Plan”. As the Ethics Centre notes, “Too often, social licence is thought to be something that can be purchased, like an offset. Big companies with controversial practices often give out community grants and investments…a social licence…might be seen as a kind of transaction where community acceptance can be bought. Of course, such an approach will often fail precisely because it is conceived as a calculated and cynical pay-off.”8
Social licence has never been earned or ‘granted’ for by UTas for its campus relocations. UTas has never required to provide an impact study or any modelling for the effects of its plans on either the intended location or on the current campuses and the local areas. Although originally intended for resource development projects, the Queensland Govt produced guidelines for preparing a local impact management plan (SIMP). 9 A similar plan should have been a requirement for the UTas relocation plans in Hobart, Launceston and Burnie, where water-front public (local/state govtowned) land has been given to UTas without any examination of local activities severely impacted/affected or at risk of serious negative impact, and an increase in infrastructure to cater for UTas desires.
The survey-report by the Australian Institute of Company Directors and KPMG on social licence, could well have been written specifically about aspects of the university sector in Australia, and could be seen as pointing the finger directly at the failures of UTas management “Vulnerable stake holders are the ones we have difficulty hearing because their voices are filtered out by layers of management that are using a business-only lens to prioritise their biggest risks…A Social licence must be earned every day.” KPMG p.7
“Social licence is an important and powerful lens to frame trust. It acknowledges the active role that people and communities play in granting ongoing acceptance and approval of how companies – or entire industries – conduct their business.(p11) 10 Aggrieved and cynical communities can withdraw the social licence of organisations that lose or exploit their trust – with potentially devastating financial, legal and regulatory impacts. Organisations can no longer view trust as an asset that they can buy or re-build after a crisis, but one that must be earned and maintained on an ongoing basis.
Surveys and petitions of the general public, UTas staff and students conducted since 2016, and assessment of social media show up to 85% opposition. Staff at the Launceston campus believe the rate among all staff there is 90%. According to a recent NTEU survey, the rate among Hobart staff to relocations there is 75%.
8 The Ethics Centre, “Ethics Explainer: Social license to operate”, ethics.org.au, 23 January 2018.
9 Lacey, Justine, “Can you legislate a social licence to operate?” The Conversation, 27 February 2013.
10 Australian Institute of Company Directors & KPMG, Maintaining the social licence to operate. 2018 KPMG – AICD Trust Survey”, 2018, pp. 11, 12.
13 Boards of all sectors are increasingly aware that fundamentally, trust is about relationships, not solely reputation… (p.11) ” We no longer place unquestioning trust in systems and institutions. Instead, trust is more likely to flow between local networks, individuals and peers…” (p. 12) UTas has nothing concrete to offer or give the local Northern Suburbs community in the way of ‘bribes’ or ‘sweeteners’ to win community support, but it has a great deal – in the form of a fully functioning campus and all that it entails - to take away, so gaining social licence is difficult, if not impossible. UTas management has made, and continues to make, endless wild promises to its staff and the public of a rosy transformed future. While limited sections of the public (strikingly and unashamedly closely associated with each other) have accepted the UTas spin and propaganda, the wider community recognises the absence of any modelling or supporting evidence, and it recognises that the main part of the UTas ‘spin’ or ‘case’ is framed in verbose general education/pedagogy unrelated to location. That is, UTas’s case is largely location-neutral, a fact well-understood by the public.
The proponents of the relocation plan have given no consideration to the destruction of local amenity and/or liveability. They have ignored all previous extensive community consultations around Inveresk Precinct land use. Museum Search Conference, genuine community input and listening by YPIPA, to community and tenants…….Folder with letters and submissions, <<<<(FNs) From the time UTas management arrived on the scene, the community (as represented by YPIPA community members, Inveresk precinct tenants) began to lose any say, and worse, were push aside. UTas and other proponents of the relocation plan continue to ignore/disregard the intent of the GHD 2006 Flood Study, the Deed and the Flood Inundation Code, and even the latest BMT Flood study, 2018. Regrettably, on all aspects of the relocation issue, the public is justified in its suspicions and mistrust of UTas and CoL,
The wider community is fully aware of the deficiencies and problems associated with Inveresk. The community also recognises the quality and value of the current Mowbray-Newnham campus/location combined with the long-term sustainability and cost effectiveness of remaining there. The vast majority of the population has not been seduced by the endless stream of media releases, media photo opportunities, marketing presentations and false gestures posturing as ‘consultation’ by UTas in its effort to gain or claim social licence. In this UTas has failed spectacularly.
Moreover, in their wilful determination and enthusiasm for their relocation project, UTas and CoL have also failed to abide by good governance principles. Governance is “the process and culture that guide the activities of an organisation beyond its basic legal obligations”. Good governance inc
Includes, but is not limited to, “acting with the highest ethical standards…fostering trusting and respectful relationships, showing a commitment to risk management…following a transparent and accountable decision-making process…” 11 In their ongoing planning chaos, their failure to abide by the highest standards of risk management, and the absence of transparency and accountability, both UTas management and CoL have sacrificed the principles of good governance.
Tasmanian DPAC, Good Governance Guide
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